The Hungarian minority question in Slovakia and Romania

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Abstract. With the redrawing of European borders following the First World War, some 5 million ethnic Hungarians were assigned minority status in neighboring countries that acquired lands formerly part of Greater Hungary. Discourse analysis of national constitutions reveal that policies toward minorities in Slovakia and Romania were particularly oppressive during the Soviet era, becoming more accommodating as EU accession neared. In this paper, I argue that national determinism, nationalism fueled by legacy, and the EU as a strong external force do not, on their own, hold explanatory power, rather, all factors taken together account for the ongoing struggle for social inclusion.

Keywords: Hungarian minorities, EU, constitutions, social inclusion, nationalism

JEL Codes: K19, K39

1. Introduction

Following the First World War, the borders of Central Eastern Europe were redrawn. With restructuring, came loss of territory and the displacement of nationals. Among the countries of Central Eastern Europe, Hungary lost the most land and citizens leading to the creation of large Hungarian minorities in neighboring countries formerly part of the Hungarian Republic (Rothschild and Wingfield, 2008, p. 5; Snyder, 2010, p. 8). Romania and Slovakia inherited the highest Hungarian diasporas of over two million and approximately 700,000, respectively (Porter, 2010, p. 233-34). Both countries share the Hungarian border, were both satellite countries of the former Soviet Union, and both are now members of the European Union (EU). In the Soviet and pre-EU accession eras, both countries had hostile policies towards their minorities to varying degrees. If we can identify factors that influence policy and understand their root causes, we are better equipped to enact more meaningful change. To evaluate national attitudes about minorities and the need to protect them, legal constitutions are a good start. In this paper, I argue that national determinism, nationalism fueled by legacy, and the EU as a strong external force do not, on their own, hold explanatory power, rather, all factors taken together account for the ongoing struggle for social inclusion.

2. Literature review and hypotheses

Pre-1993, Slovakia was part of Czechoslovakia under a federal system with Prague at the epicentre of power and Slovakia retaining limited autonomy (Constitution of Czechoslovakia, 1960). The region will henceforth be referred to as ‘Slovakia’. To manage the newly acquired large minority populations, both Slovakia and Romania pushed aggressive assimilation agendas after WWII in policy areas of religion, economy, culture (especially language) and political and legal rights (Tóth, 1996, p. 426). Although minority protection clauses were present in the post-WWI treaties, they were largely ignored by both countries and not enforced by other nations (Tóth, 1996, 492). In Slovakia, policy was particularly aggressive regarding lack of language protection and education rights, along with unresolved land claims in the post-WWI era (Gyurcsik and Satterwhite, 1996, p. 513-514). Romanian policy was aimed at assimilation (Szépe, 1999, p.
84), concentrating aggression in the formerly Hungarian Transylvania. Transylvanian Hungarians were forced to relocate across the country to lessen the sphere of influence and solidarity of numbers in the coveted region. The logic was that if Hungarian minorities mobilized, they may petition (successfully) for separation and reclamation of lost territory (Tóth, 1996, p. 428).

To trace minority policy change over time, we need to understand what propelled those changes. Charles Jokay (1996) cites three factors which underpin and fuel ethnic conflict and tensions: competing interests regarding the national borders outlining territory, non-democratic practices such as discriminating policies and lack of transparency, which offer the opportunity for discriminating policies, and lastly, weak treaties where rights may be alluded to, but in ambiguous language or no measure of enforcing such rights (p. 379). Constitutions, as a formal blueprint dictating how a nation will be governed, offer useful insight into a specific nation’s values underpinning policy. However, rights on paper do not automatically translate into strong policy action. Strong, effective policy demands a means of enforcement. Rights must also “have teeth”, spelled out within the constitutional framework as Jokay argues for. This could take the form of court procedures or watchdog institutions to provide accountability. Accommodation and tolerance of minority populations are needed, along with an institutional framework in place to ensure such directives.

Legacy theory proposes that the particular history of a nation, such as loss of territory following the World Wars and the struggle for sovereignty under Soviet rule, directs policy. Competing interests regarding national borders and treatment of historically displaced minorities underpin and fuel ethnic conflict and tensions (Jokay, 1996, p. 379). These ‘initial conditions’ and the incentives they create provide limited maneuverability for political actors and fuel continued mobilization. In contrast, other scholars emphasize the role of new external influences, such as the European Union and its institutions, as a strong normative power during the pre and post-accession period, to explain post-Soviet political development (Reisch, 1996, p. 461). For example, following the collapse of communism, xenophobia, and nationalism rose in Slovakia, settling in response to condemnations from the European Union (Rothschild and Wingfield, 2008, p. 220-221).

Convincing causal explanation must consider both deeply rooted institutional legacy factors, along with shallower social factors and triggers. While legacy theory possesses compelling explanations of policy change during the communist era, it does not fully capture the picture of why such policy was implemented in the first place, nor explain post-communist policy change (Kitschelt, 2001). Alternately, the impact on minority policy of the normative force of European Union accession and membership may also be limited considering the persistence of historical disputes and grievances.

2.1. Hypotheses

- The findings will show little difference between Soviet era policies and post-Soviet constitutions, indicating that minority policy remains discriminating and oppressive. From this, we would glean that the EU is not an influential normative power and perhaps Soviet legacy factors are at play.
- Alternately, the pre and post-Soviet policies and constitutions may differ radically, with Soviet era policies demonstrating oppression, and the new constitutions reflecting a radical shift in thought regarding minorities. Such findings would suggest the EU is a strong normative agent and the legacy theory hypothesis is weak.
- A third possibility is a middle ground showing a limited redrafting of policy. Limitations may include ambiguous language or important omissions, leaving room for varying legal interpretations. This scenario suggests the EU is a limited normative force. Candidate countries can draft policy that, on paper, conforms to EU standards regarding equality and protection of minorities, but in practice, lacks enforcement. Realizing this hypothesis demands a closer look at legacy factors to better explain policy change.
3. Method

To identify minority policy in Slovakia and Romania, a discourse analysis of the Slovak and Romanian constitutions will be conducted to determine how ethnic policy was framed. “A discourse analysis entails a close reading of texts, paying particular attention to what is being said in what way and what is omitted. The method provides a powerful conceptual tool to carefully examine legal documents and tease out larger themes and representations of groups not immediately apparent within the texts” (Lugosi, 2001, p. 9). The constitutions will be read closely, paying attention to clauses indicating minority, cultural, and political rights. The new constitutional amending formulas will also be examined as legal rights are protected less if amendments have a low threshold.

As artifacts of law, constitutions matter because they detail the framework of possibility and boundaries by which a nation will be governed. Adam Czarnota (1995) contends that the “most obvious formal manifestation of future politics are new constitutions” (p. 83). Soviet and post-Soviet constitutions will be analyzed because Slovakia and Romania drafted entirely new constitutions in their consolidation paths, rather than reforming or amending the previous, Soviet era documents. If the constitutions differ radically from previous minority policy, then Soviet influence on the region cannot be ruled out as a factor driving policy. This would not suggest Soviet ideology was inherently discriminating of ethnic minorities, but rather, that the hegemonic threats and pressures of Soviet influence played on national insecurities and quests for retaining power over people and territory. Difference would also indicate a stronger commitment to constitutional framework, as hindsight reveals that Soviet era constitutions alluded to citizen rights, while masking communist party power (Wolczuk, 2007, p. 230). On the other hand, if minority clauses in the constitutions do not differ widely from previous content, then Soviet influence must be a lower ranking factor.

3.1 Limitations

While constitutions offer insight to national values about the rule of law, they do so in a limited way. For instance, ethnic tensions could fester under the surface, masked by a government that was not concerned with fairness and equality along pluralist lines. The explosion of nationalist government policies following Soviet collapse demonstrates this (Szépe, 1999, p. 71). Rules and statements on paper do not account for much unless there are safeguards in place to ensure the enforcement of such rules. However, even with safeguards in place, laws do not automatically equate to actualization of values and rules. Further, Kataryna Wolczuk (2007) writes, “constitutional frameworks are intertwined with cultural, historical and economic factors to the extent that the actual functioning of political systems is not determined by, and thus cannot be attributed to, constitutional design alone” (p. 244). While a project measuring the effectiveness of all possible factors is beyond the scope of this study, the constitutional analyses will be supplemented by examining primary EU documents. In anticipation of enlargement and the possibility of accession, after careful research, the European Commission drew up progress reports with policy recommendations for each of the candidate countries to meet strict accession criteria. Using these sources offers insight to how an outside institution interpreted Slovakian and Romanian minority policies. The documents are also useful since the Commission is very specific about weak policy areas.

4. Results

4.1. The (Czecho)slovakian Constitutions

The federal composition of Czechoslovakia was addressed in Chapter 1, The Social Order, of the Czechoslovakia Constitution 1960. Citizen rights were set out in Chapter 2, stating, “Equal rights regardless of nationality, race, or sex are guaranteed. Education is free and compulsory to the age of sixteen; citizens
of Hungarian, Ukrainian, and Polish origin are ensured ‘every opportunity and all means for education in their mother tongue’” (Constitution of Czechoslovakia 1960). The above suggests minority protection of minorities was in place under communist rule. The socialist model aspired to level all citizens to the status of workers, thereby fostering equality across the state, as opposed to different groups. However, there appeared to be room for pluralism as minority language rights were upheld. How this played out in practice is another matter.

The Constitution of the Slovak Republic 1991, Preamble begins with, “We, the Slovak nation, mindful of the political and cultural heritage of our forebears, and of the centuries of experience from the struggle for national existence and our own statehood...together with members of national minorities and ethnic groups living on the territory of the Slovak Republic...”. Here, we see primacy of historically Slovakian citizens and the struggle for sovereignty, and acknowledgment of minorities on Slovakian territory as distinct, but not Slovakian. Article 6, addressing language, states “(1) Slovak is the state language on the territory of the Slovak Republic. [and] (2) The use of other languages in dealings with the authorities will be regulated by law”, indicating strong nationalist sentiment among Slovaks, regarding language. No mention of the Magyar (Hungarian) language is striking considering 700 000 ethnic Hungarians reside on the Slovakian/Hungarian border (Ramit, 1994, 99). While there is vague mention of “other languages” being regulated in official dealings, there is nothing to suggest what that means for bilingual policy options. The vagueness potentially omits official protection of minority languages.

Article 12, the Equality Clause, states,

“(2) Basic rights and liberties on the territory of the Slovak Republic are guaranteed to everyone regardless of sex, race, color of skin, language, creed and religion, political or other beliefs, national or social origin, affiliation to a nation or ethnic group, property, descent, or another status. No one must be harmed, preferred, or discriminated against on these grounds.

(3) Everyone has the right to freely decide on his nationality. Any influence on this decision and any form of pressure aimed at assimilation are forbidden.”

In a functioning democracy, an equality clause is an essential constitutional ingredient, but such a clause can also present a legal loophole for dismissing minority rights on the premise that protecting minority languages violates constitutional rights, especially since promoting minority protection presents a case of ‘preferential treatment’ explicitly banned in Section 1. Section 3 discusses guarantees of protection against assimilation, which on paper sounds good, but one must wonder how this plays out in practice considering minority status is not protected.

Part IV, Rights of National Minorities and Ethnic Groups, Article 34, is of particular interest. Rights to language are set out and guaranteed, albeit in a limited manner, with the right to education and civil groups in the mother tongue ‘acceptable’ under law. However, the onus to set up and maintain such institutions remains with the minority groups themselves, as set out in Article 1. This begs the question of where project funding might come from. Klaus von Beyme (2003) claims, “...the Slovakian formulation ...did not impose a duty but only mentioned the ‘right of ethnic minorities to learn the official language.’ This did not rule out the possibility of conflict with the Hungarian minority...” (p. 203). Following an aggressive attempt to enforce the use of Slovakian names of ethnically Hungarian cities and towns, the Council of Europe intervened (von Beyme, 2003, p. 203). Such constitutional omissions are interpreted as politically motivated restrictions on the use of Hungarian language by Hungarians, Slovakian and national (Szépe, 1999, p. 81).

Section 3 states, “The enactment of the rights of citizens belonging to national minorities and ethnic groups that are guaranteed in this Constitution must not be conducive to jeopardizing the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Slovak Republic or to discrimination against its other inhabitants”. This means minority and ethnic groups may mobilize, but not for the purpose of pursuing
separatist agendas, presenting a contradiction to the equality clause, Article 12, wherein, “No one must be harmed, preferred, or discriminated against on these grounds [of which political beliefs are included].” The rights of political parties are limited in that they must conform to national sentiment. In fact, “The Slovak Constitution provides that the President is to be recalled for activities against sovereignty, and that national minorities may not jeopardize Slovakia’s sovereignty” (Albi, 2005, p. 31). Even someone in the highest office, then, can be ousted for showing sympathy for redrawing the borders along ethnic lines. Border insecurity presumably stems from desires to retain post-WWI territory. Finally, Title Nine, Transitory and Final Provisions, Article 152 (1), indicates, “Constitutional laws, laws and other generally binding legal regulations shall remain in force in the Slovak Republic unless they are in contradiction with this Constitution. They can be amended and repealed by the appropriate authorities of the Slovak Republic”. Ambiguous rights and the weak amending formula suggest a need for further constitutional development before legal equality can be achieved.

4.2. European Commission opinion on Slovakia

In 1997, the European Commission published opinion reports on the progress of membership candidate countries. After thorough research, these reports included benchmarks each country was required to meet as a pre-condition to accession, specifically detailing the areas of each applicant’s barriers to accession for the aimed 2004 benchmark. The opinions are measured against the Copenhagen criteria for membership outlined in the report as follows:

“The associated countries in Central and Eastern Europe that so desire shall become members of the Union. Accession will take place as soon as a country is able to assume the obligations of membership by satisfying the economic and political conditions. Membership requires:

- that the candidate country has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities;
- the existence of a functioning market economy, as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union;
- the ability to take on the obligations of membership, including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union” (1997).

Regarding the “Minority Rights and Protection of Minorities” section, Slovakia was performing poorly. Put simply, the ill treatment of minorities in Slovakia presented the largest barrier to democratic consolidation (Gyurcsik and Satterwhite, 1996, p. 519). The Commission asserted, “Minorities are protected first of all by a number of international norms. In September 1995 Slovakia ratified the Council of Europe’s framework convention on minorities. However, it has not subscribed to recommendation 1201 of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe which provides for the collective rights of minorities although without being legally binding. Following the signature in March 1995 of a treaty of friendship and cooperation with Hungary, the Slovak Parliament accompanied ratification in March 1996 by two declarations denying recognition of based autonomous administrative structures” (1997).

Further, the Commission reported ongoing tensions between Hungarian minorities and the Slovakian government and the constitutional and legal framework lacked in that, while “It is true that other texts govern those of minority languages in specific fields (public life, courts, radio and television, public schools and road signs) but these do not cover all situations and there is still no overall [comprehensive] text”. These legal omissions have resulted in a political vacuum where discriminating policy such as cutting back on subsidies and funding for Hungarian cultural associations and the discontinuation of reports and
4.3. The Romanian Constitutions

Like Czechoslovakia, the pre-1989 constitution of Romania was modeled according to the Soviet framework of communism. “As had its predecessor, the 1952 constitution guaranteed full equality to national minority groups, and it also established an autonomous administrative unit for the large ethnic Hungarian population—the Hungarian Autonomous Region. The region was given its own council and local authorities, although these bodies were clearly subordinate to the organs of the central government” (Bachman, 1989). This clause seems to suggest Hungarian minorities in Romania enjoyed a protected status. However, history shows that the Romanian government pushed a brutal assimilation agenda, especially with the nearly extinct Csangos people, banning the use of Hungarian language and forcing people to relocate away from the Hungarian/Romanian border (Szépe, 1999, p. 73). These policies clearly violated constitutional laws and demonstrate how rights on paper that lack enforcement allows room for oppressive policy with no fear of accountability or repercussion.

Following the Soviet collapse, Romania drafted a brand new constitution in 1991. Article 1, begins, “Romania is a sovereign, independent, unitary and indivisible National State. The form of government of the Romanian State is a Republic. Romania is a democratic and social State governed by the rule of law, in which human dignity, the citizens’ rights and freedoms, the free development of human personality, justice and political pluralism represent supreme values and shall be guaranteed”.

In the Nationalities Papers, Andrew Bell (1996) notes the first line of the new constitution renders the state indivisible (p. 500). Like the Slovakian constitution, this reflects insecurity around the borders of territory acquired in the interwar period. Such policy lends credence to the legacy theory.

Articles 2 and 3, addressing Sovereignty and Territory, further enshrine the indivisibility of the state by declaring, “National sovereignty resides with the Romanian people, who shall exercise it through its representative bodies and by referendum. [Furthermore], no group or person may exercise sovereignty in one’s own name” (Article 2, 1991). Like the Slovakian constitution, the ambiguity of Article 2 leaves room for discriminate policies. Article 3 re-affirms the inalienability of the state.

Under Article 4, “Unity of the people and equality among citizens”, issues of equality in the Romanian state are outlined, “The State foundation is laid on the unity of the Romanian people. Romania is the common and indivisible homeland of all its citizens, without any discrimination on account of race, nationality, ethnic origin, language, religion, sex, opinion, political adherence, property or social origin.”

Once again, equality on paper does not equate actualization. Moreover, there is nothing here to address, or even acknowledge, past inequality and discrimination against national minorities. In a similar vein, Article 6, “Right to Identity” declares, “The State recognizes and guarantees the right of persons belonging to national minorities, to the preservation, development and expression of their ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity. The protecting measures taken by the Romanian State for the preservation, development and expression of identity of the persons belonging to national minorities shall conform to the principles of equality and nondiscrimination
in relation to the other Romanian citizens”.

Again, we see a measure of equality on paper, but like Article 4, no commitment to redress past grievances are presented, and like the Slovakian constitution, it is unclear how such rights would be upheld.

Moving on to language, Article 13 explicitly states, “In Romania, the official language is Romanian”. Elevating Romanian language status as the prominent and only official state language implies that in a nation of equals, ethnic Romanians are first because minorities were addressed in the constitution, however thinly, regarding language concessions, “it would have been logical for the Romanian parliament to enact special legislation on the national minorities or the use of languages other than Romanian” (Szépe, 1999, p. 71-72).

Article 30 guarantees, “Freedom of expression of thoughts, opinions, or beliefs, and freedom of any creation, by words, in writing, in pictures, by sounds or other means of communication in public are inviolable. [In addition, a]ny censorship shall be prohibited”. The exception is that freedoms must conform to earlier declarations that forbid any concessions threatening sovereignty or promote the indivisibility of the state.

Article 37, contents,

“Citizens may freely associate into political parties, trade unions and other forms of association. Any political parties or organizations which, by their aims or activity, militate against political pluralism, the principles of a State governed by the rule of law, or against the sovereignty, integrity or independence of Romania shall be unconstitutional.”

The problem with this clause is pluralism in Parliament is denied (Gyurcsik and Satterwhite, 1996, p. 511). This is because political parties based on ethnicity, religion, or language are banned (Bell, 1996, p. 502). Although political parties based on ethnic lines were not unconstitutional, per se, in Romania, Hungarians are often perceived as a security threat to the country. Calls for strong minority rights are seen as a divisive attack on national order and society (Tóth, 1996, p. 428). This poses a threat to the stability of the country by fueling sentiment, which may erupt in violence and civil conflict in pursuit of autonomy. Moreover, rights claims pursued by Hungarian minorities are interpreted as a vehicle for separation, and therefore, also pose a potential threat to the territorial make up of the country (Jokay, 1996, p. 384). Any glimmer of national pride and push for rights and autonomy is automatically translated as a threat to sovereignty. When dominant policy discourse frames Hungarian minorities in this fashion, it is very difficult, if nearly impossible, for Hungarian minorities to improve their conditions, since any deviation from assimilation is viewed with deep suspicion, thus restricting options for pluralism. We saw this earlier with the Slovakian case where autonomy for Slovak Hungarians was equated with a weak Slovak state (Reisch, 1996, p. 459). Unlike Slovakia, however, the Romanian constitutional amendment formula is much stronger suggesting greater commitment to protecting rights. Article 148 (2), “Limits to Amendment” asserts “no revision shall be made if it results in the suppression of the citizens fundamental rights and freedoms, or the safeguards thereof”.

4.4. European Commission opinion on Romania

According to the Commission report, Romania has fared quite well regarding Hungarian minorities, particularly vis-à-vis Slovakia. Representation in Parliament is increasing and minority protection laws have been drafted. Romania has ratified international agreements on the norms of protecting minority rights, including a bilateral treaty with Hungary concerning ethnic Hungarians (1997). However, there are shortcomings. For instance, “Article 236 of the Criminal Code punishing any person singing a foreign national anthem or carrying a foreign flag... [an obvious]... attack on minorities” (European Commission,
Aside from minority protection and rights, an area where Romania is steadily improving, the main area of weakness barring EU accession for Romania is deep-rooted corruption within government and lack of ability to enforce laws (1997). The minority question in Romania in this time period is difficult to analyze as protective measures are in place, on paper, but without enforcement measures. These legal shortcomings, along with cited corruption, delayed Romanian accession until 2007, opposed to Slovakian accession in 2004.

5. Discussion

Under Czechoslovakian federalism, the constitution guaranteed minority rights in terms of equality for all peoples as prescribed by the Soviet model. The rise of nationalism increased following the Velvet Divorce, the break-up of Czechoslovakia, resulting in oppressive discriminating policy. Nationalism can be attributed to the newly found sovereignty of the Slovak nation and insecurity over losing territory to ethnic Hungarians. It could also be the case that such resentment towards minority groups always quietly existed under the blanket of socialism. Towards democratic consolidation, and especially following condemnation for the treatment of Hungarian minorities by the European Commission, Slovakia conformed to strict Copenhagen criteria, leading to eventual accession to the European union in 2004.

Some of the most brutal and oppressive treatment of Hungarian minorities occurred in Romania during the Soviet years. Policies of aggressive assimilation were pursued, including persecution for using the Hungarian language and goals of purging Transylvania of ethnic Hungarians. The new 1991 constitution still lacked ‘teeth’ to enforce minority rights, but ratifying international treaties with the Council of Europe and Hungary steadily made improvements. While corruption and weak laws delayed consolidation, Romania eventually conformed to pan-European standards and joined the EU in 2007.

Thought stemming from legacy theory certainly possesses compelling explanations of why policy during the Soviet era and the immediate aftermath thereof was enacted. A key “feature of the post-communist constitutions of Central and Eastern Europe is that they are distinctly more protective of sovereignty than most constitutions in Western Europe” (Albi, 2005, p. 24). Given the legacy of oppression, this is not surprising. It does, however, lend credence to the theory of legacy as a strong factor driving policy. Such a causal factor, however, can be thought of as ‘too deep’, meaning its explanatory power does not fully capture the picture of why particular policy was implemented in the first place. Moreover, legacy theory provides no explanation for why the policies changed, or at least appeared to, after Soviet collapse (Kitschelt, 2001).

Alternately, looking at the EU as the driving normative force has limits too. While the EU undoubtedly carries normative weight, the countries of Central Eastern Europe had to want to join a priori to any normative power to be exercised over the region. Because of historical oppression, countries would be unwilling to hand over newly found sovereignty, as demonstrated in the Preambles and opening articles in the post-communist constitutions. It could be argued, then, that the EU is not the driving force behind Slovakian and Romanian reformation of policy regarding Hungarian minorities, but instead, national determinism of self-interest, which happened to be joining the EU. Neither legacy theory nor the EU as a normative force thesis, in isolation, fully explains why minority policy changed over time. Scholars like Herbert Kitschelt assert that good causal explanations come from theories that take deeply rooted institutional legacy factors, along with shallower social factors and triggers into account (2001).

6. Conclusion

The aim of this study was to show how policies toward Hungarian minorities in Slovakia and Romania have changed over time what might explain changes, or lack of. In the Slovak and Romanian cases, policies toward Hungarian minorities did change. In the case of Slovakia, racist policies and sentiment
mushroomed following independence. Eventually, in order to meet EU accession standards set out by the Copenhagen Criteria, Slovakian policy conformed, at least on paper, and joined the EU in 2004. Romania also showed a change in policy toward minorities from brutally oppressive and assimilation oriented, to protecting the rights of minorities, joining the EU in 2007. Neither legacy theory, nor understanding the EU as normative force adequately explains the reason policies changed. Taken together, however, both explanations offer a better account of why policies toward Hungarian minorities changed in Slovakia and Romania. This finding suggests the third hypothesis of a mid-point position showing a limited redrafting of policy is strongest. The implications are possibilities for ongoing tensions with little legal resolve. To fully realize the massive goal of social cohesion, national self-reflection of logic underpinning constitutional rights and design is good place to start.

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8. References


